DISPARATE APPLICATION OF TUE CONTEMPORARY OBJECTION RULE AND TILE
 ENDS OF JUSTICE  EXCEPTION IN CAPITAL CASES by Sprano, Michael C.
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 10 | Issue 2 Article 18
Spring 3-1-1998
DISPARATE APPLICATION OF TUE
CONTEMPORARY OBJECTION RULE AND
TILE "ENDS OF JUSTICE" EXCEPTION IN
CAPITAL CASES
Michael C. Sprano
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael C. Sprano, DISPARATE APPLICATION OF TUE CONTEMPORARY OBJECTION RULE AND TILE "ENDS OF JUSTICE"
EXCEPTION IN CAPITAL CASES, 10 Cap. DEF J. 68 (1998).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol10/iss2/18
Page 68 - Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2
DISPARATE APPLICATION OF TUE CONTEMPORARY OBJECTION RULE AND TILE
"ENDS OF JUSTICE" EXCEPTION IN CAPITAL CASES
BY: MICHAEL C. SPRANO
I. Introduction
A fundamental principle of death penalty jurispru-
dence has been the idea that "death is different" from any
other penalty that a state can impose. Because of this dif-
ference, courts have held that capital cases warrant the
application of more stringent procedural safeguards than
noncapital criminal cases. However, some courts seem to be
doing just the opposite.' Instead of raising the level of pro-
cedural protection afforded in capital versus noncapital
cases, courts are lowering it. Instead of "super due process,"2
capital defendants simply get "speedy due process"
This article examines the disparate application of pro-
cedural default rules in capital cases in Virginia. Specifically,
the article demonstrates that the "ends of justice" exception
to the contemporaneous objection rule, which is routinely
considered in noncapital cases, is neither applied nor even
discussed in cases in which the defendant has been sen-
tenced to death.The result is that Virginia enforces its pro-
cedural default rules most rigidly in the very cases in which
they can potentially produce the most egregious harm.
H. The Principle that 'Death is Different'
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, because a
death sentence is qualitatively different from any other
penalty, the level of procedural protection required in capi-
tal cases is greater than that which is required in noncapital
cases.' Perhaps the best statement of this rule is the follow-
ing passage from Justice Stevens' opinion in Woodson v.
North Carolina':
'Diane Wells, Federal Habeas CorpusAnd The Death Penalty:
A Need ForA Return To The Principles Of Furman. 80 J. CiaM. L.
& CItMINOLOGY 427,448-50 (1989).The author concludes that the
United States Supreme Court's willingness to retreat from its earli-
er pronouncements that capital defendants are entitled to greater
procedural protections "reflect the impatience, expressed by some
members of the Court, with lengthy execution delays attributable
to federal habeas corpus proceedings."Wells, at 450.
2Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections On Two Decades Of Constitutional Regulation of
Capital Punishment, 109 Hv. L. R.v 355,360 n.12 (1995).
'Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that jurors must
be allowed to consider all mitigating circumstances); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (holding that the jury must be
instructed on lesser included offenses); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding mandatory death penalty
for first degree murder unconstitutional). Wells, supra note 1, at
448, n.172.
4428 U.S. 280 (1976).
[T1he penalty of death is qualitatively different from
a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death,
in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only
a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.5
In Beck v. Alabama,6 the Court reaffirmed this stan-
dard, observing that"[a] s we have often stated, there is a sig-
nificant constitutional difference between the death penal-
ty and lesser punishments."7 In 1984,Justice Stevens noted
that "every Member of this Court has written or joined at
least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of
its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualita-
tively different from any other punishment, and hence must
be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a
justified response to a given offense."
In order to attain the enhanced level of reliability
required in capital cases, procedural protections must be
strictly enforced.9 This enforcement, in turn, depends
upon the careful review of capital trials by appellate
courts. Because of the irrevocability of the death penalty,
no error can be corrected once the sentence has been car-
ried out. Therefore, the requirement of heightened relia-
bility should mean that procedural default rules are
enforced less strictly in capital than in noncapital cases.'0
'Woodson, at 305.
6447 U.S. 625,637 (1980).
7James A. Shellenberger & James A. Strazzella, The Lesser
Included Offense Doctrine and the Constitution: The
Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79
MARQ. L. REv. 1, 20, n.50 (1995).
8Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S 447,468 (Stevens,J. concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
9See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) ("[This
Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the pris-
oner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guar-
antee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not
imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice or mistake."); Proffitt v.
Wainwright, 685 E2d 1227, 1253 (11th Cir. 1982) (O'Connor, J.
concurring) ("the view, once prevalent, that the procedural
requirements applicable to capital sentencing are no more rigor-
ous than those governing noncapital sentencing decisions ... is no
longer valid.") Wells, supra note 1, at 448-49, n.174, 178.
10In a related context, one author wrote that "[t]his realization
that 'death is different' also applies to the theory that courts
should exercise more flexibility in granting federal habeas review
when a life is at stake"Wells, supra note 1, at 448.
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Accordingly any exceptions to the rules should be applied
more liberally."
Adherence to this principle by Virginia courts would
mean that the contemporaneous objection rule would be
less rigidly enforced in capital cases than it is in noncapital
cases. One way of accomplishing this would be to relax the
standard for applying the ends of justice exception. This
would allow the courts to hear potentially meritorious
claims that were not raised at trial.
In practice, however, courts in Virginia usually do just
the opposite. While the courts routinely consider the ends
of justice exception when applying the contemporaneous
objection rule in noncapital cases, they routinely ignore the
exception in capital cases. The result is that capital defen-
dants get even less procedural protections than noncapital
defendants.
M. The Contemporaneous Objection Rules in
Virginia
In Virginia, the most common form of procedural
default is the so-called contemporaneous objection rule. 2
There are actually two rules which deal with this issue. Rule
5:25 applies when a case comes before the Supreme Court
of Virginia.The rule states that "[e]rror will not be sustained
to any rulings of the trial court ... unless the objection was
stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling,
except for good cause shown or to attain the ends of jus-
tice."3 For cases that come before the Virginia Court of
Appeals, Rule 5A:18 states that" [n] o ruling of the trial court
... will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objec-
tion was stated together with the grounds therefor at the
time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to
attain the ends of justice." 4 Of the two exceptions noted
in the rules, the ends of justice exception is by far the most
relevant to modem practice. "The 'good cause shown'
exception has not been found to apply to any cases and was
only once discussed, and that in 192715
"In 1990, the American BarAssociation Task Force On Death
Penalty Habeas Corpus recommended in its "Report to the House
of Delegates" that state appellate courts review all claims of con-
stitutional error not raised at trial under a "knowing, understand-
ing, and voluntary waiver standard ... and have a plain error rule
and apply it liberally with respect to errors of state law.' Ira P
Robbins, Toward A More Just And Effective System of Review In
State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1990).
2Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths And The Injustice Of
Death:A Critique Of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part Two),
30 U. RicH. L. REv. 303,363 (1996). In a review of all death-sentence
cases in Virginia in which a procedural default rule was invoked,
"[t]he contemporaneous objection rule was found to be the
largest and most important group of procedurally defaulted issues
in the cases reviewed.' This author's independent research con-
firmed that conclusion.
"'SuP.CT.RuLoS, Rule 5:25 (West 1997) (emphasis added) (for-
merly Rule 5:21.)
14Su.CT.RuLEs, Rule 5A:18 (West 1997) (emphasis added.)
"Clarke, supra note 12, at 367 (citation omitted).
IV. The Ends of Justice Exception in Noncapital
Criminal Cases
One of the earliest discussions of the applicability of
the ends of justice exception in Virginia is contained in
Cooper v. Commonwealth.'6 The defendant was convicted
of raping a four year-old girl. On appeal, Copper challenged
the admission of incriminating statements made during a
post-indictment interrogation without the presence of
counsel. Cooper was advised of his rights to remain silent
and to have counsel present and waived them. 7 He did not
object to the admission of this evidence at trial."' The ques-
tion before the court was whether Cooper was procedural-
ly barred from raising this issue on appeal because of the
contemporaneous objection rule, or whether the ends of
justice exception should be applied to allow the court to
consider the claim of error. To resolve this question, the
court examined how the ends of justice exception had
been interpreted by several prominent authorities in crimi-
nal law. The court first quoted the following passage from
American Jurisprudence, Appeal and Error:
In the exercise of its power to do so, an appellate
court will consider questions not raised or
reserved in the trial court when it appears neces-
sary to do so in order to meet the ends of justice or
to prevent the invasion or take notice of errors
appearing upon may, as a matter of grace .... take
notice of errors appearing upon the record which
deprived the accused of substantial means of
enjoying a fair and impartial trial ..... 19
The court then cited Wharton's Criminal Law and
Procedure:
An appellate court may, however, take cognizance
of errors, though not assigned, when they relate to
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject mat-
ter, are fundamental, or when such review is essen-




After reviewing the record before it, the court concluded
that because "under the facts and circumstances of this case
the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel, the ends of justice exception
must be applied, and the conviction set aside.
2 '
16205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688 (1965).
7Cooper, 205 Va. at 891,140 S.E.2d at 694.
18 d. at 884, 140 S.E.2d at 692.
'9Cooper, 205 Va. at 889, 1405 S.E.2d at 693 (quoting 3
Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 248, p. 33).
20Id. at 889,1405 S.E.2d at 693 (quoting Wharton's Criminal
Law and Procedure, Vol 5, § 2253, p. 509).
21Id. at 892, 140 S.E.2d at 694.
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A more narrow formulation of the rule was stated in
Mounce v. Commonwealth.' Mounce was convicted of felo-
nious unauthorized use of an automobile. 23 On appeal,
Mounce claimed that the Commonwealth had failed to prove
that the value of the car exceed $200.24The court of appeals
held that because defense counsel had not made a motion to
strike or a motion to set aside the verdict at trial, the issue
was barred under Rule 5A:18.2 1 The court considered the
application of the ends of justice exception, but decided not
to apply it to this case.' It was not enough, according to the
court, for the defendant to show that the Commonwealth
had failed to prove an element of the offense. Citing Ryan v.
Commonwealthv7 for the proposition that the exception
only applied when the defendant could show that a miscar-
riage of justice had "clearly occurred,' the court in Mounce
ruled that the record must "affirmatively [show] that a mis-
carriage of justice has occurred, not ... merely ... that a mis-
carriage might have occurred:'
Similarly, in Redman v. Commonwealth,29 the court
held that, in order to successfully invoke the ends of justice
exception, the defendant must show either: 1) that he or
she was convicted of conduct which was not criminal; or 2)
that an element of the offense did not occur."0 The
Commonwealth's failure to present evidence to prove one
or more elements of the offense, in this case,"demonstrates
only that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred, not
that a miscarriage of justice did occur."3
A broader interpretation of the ends of justice excep-
tion was adopted in Brown v. Commonwealth.32 The defen-
dant was convicted of burglary. At the sentencing hearing,
the trial court determined Brown's sentence in reliance on
a different burglary than the one for which he was convict-
ed. Brown's counsel made no objection at the time of sen-
tencing.33 In deciding whether or not to consider this issue
on appeal, the court first looked to the underlying purpos-
es of the contemporary objection rule.
The laudatory purpose behind Rule 5A:18, and its
equivalent Supreme Court Rule 5:25 ... is to
require that objections be promptly brought to the
attention of the trial court with sufficient specifici-
ty that the alleged error can be dealt with and time-
ly addressed and corrected when necessary. The
rules promote orderly and efficient justice and are
114 Va.App. 433,357 S.E.2d 742 (1987).
23Mounce, 4 Va.App. at 434, 357 S.E.2d at 743.
241d.
2Id.
21Id. at 435-37,357 S.E.2d at 744.
27219 Va. 439,247 S.E.2d 698 (1978).
28Mounce, 4 VaApp. at 436, 357 S.E.2d at 744 (emphasis in
original).
925 Va.App. 215,487 S.E.2d 269 (1997).
I'Redman, 25 Va.App. at 221-24, 487 S.E.2d at 272-74.
311d. at 223,487 S.E.2d at 273 (emphasis in original).
"8 Va.App. 126,380 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
"Brown, 8 Va.App. at 129,380 S.E.2d at 9.
to be strictly enforced except where the error has
resulted in manifest injustice .... Because our func-
tion is to review the rulings of the trial court, rather
than superintend the proceedings, we will notice
error for which there has been no timely objection
only when necessary to satisfy the ends of justice.31
Significantly, the court implied that consideration of the
ends of justice exception was mandatory whenever the con-
temporaneous objection rule potentially applied. "Whether
we apply the bar of Rule 5A:18 or invoke the ends of justice
exception, we must evaluate the nature and effect of the
error to determine whether a clear miscarriage of justice
occurred' 3 In reaching this question, the Court ofAppeals in
Brown held that trial courts "must determine whether the
error clearly had an effect upon the outcome of the case; and
whether the error"involve[d] substantial rights."I'The court
went on to state that "[t ]he language in Mounce that to avail
himself of the rule the defendant had to affirmatively show
[that] 'a miscarriage of justice [has] occurred, not ... that a
miscarriage might have occurred' requires that the error be
clear, substantial, and material."3 7 The result in Mounce,
according to the court in Brown, was justified because,
although there was no direct evidence to establish the nec-
essary element (i.e.- the value of the car), there was suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict."
Thus, the court"could not say that the finding as to value was
clearly erroneous.
"39
The construction of the ends of justice exception
announced in Brown was reaffirmed in Campbell v.
Commonwealth.4°The defendant, a judge, was convicted of
forging a public record. The court found that the jury
instruction was an "incorrect statement of law" regarding
intent.41 Although the defendant had failed to object to this
instruction at trial, the court applied the ends of justice
exception and set aside the conviction because the jury
could have convicted the defendant for otherwise innocent
behavior.The court held that, contrary to the interpretation
advanced by the Commonwealth, Mounce does not mean
that the ends of justice provision applies "only if the error
'invariably works a miscarriage of justice' 42 Instead, the
court cited the standard announced in Brown, holding that
the error must be "clear, substantial, and material."'43 The con-
curring opinion, written by Judge Barrow, emphasized that
the ends of justice exception must be applied in light of the
purposes underlying the contemporaneous objection rule
itself.4 Judge Barrow reasoned that when a party already
-1d. at 131,380 S.E.2d at 10 (citation omitted).
31Id. (emphasis added).
"Id.
37Brown, 8Va.App. at 132, 380 S.E.2d at 11.
1Id.
39Id.
4014 Va.App. 988, 421 S.E.2d 652 (1992).
4 Campbell, 14Va.App. at 990,421 S.E.2d at 653.
12Id. at 993,421 S.E.2d at 655 (citation omitted).
13Id. (quoting Brown, 8Va.App. at 132,380 S.E.2d at 11.)
44Id. at 996,421 S.E.2d at 657.
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has a strong incentive to object at the time the ruling is
issued, the goals of the rule are already satisfied.
4 5
Therefore, in those instances, the ends of justice excep-
tion should be applied whenever the alleged error is
"clear, substantial and material."46
Another case which implied that consideration of
the ends of justice exception is mandatory whenever the
contemporaneous objection rule is potentially triggered
was Johnson v. Commonwealth.17 The defendant was
convicted of aggravated sexual battery of a fourteen
year-old boy. On appeal, Johnson claimed that there was
insufficient evidence to show that force was used.48
Because he had failed to raise this issue at trial, Rule
5A:18 barred consideration of the issue by the court of
appeals unless the court applied the ends of justice
exception to the rule. After citing the standard
announced in Mounce, the court stated that "the applic-
ability of this exception cannot be determined on the
mere assertion of the general rule, but necessarily
requires our review of the record: 9 After examining the
record in its entirety the court concluded that "the evi-
dence . . . does not support [the] conviction . . . :so
Therefore, the court was convinced that"a miscarriage of
justice [had] occurred"'
The Supreme Court of Virginia followed a similar
approach in Jiminez v. Commonwealth.5 2 The defendant
challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence and the
jury instructions given at trial.The court noted the lack of a
contemporaneous objection, and stated that "consequently,
we must" consider whether to invoke Rule 5:25 .... or to
apply the rule's exception, in order'to attain the ends of jus-
tice.'"" The court examined the record and found that the
Commonwealth had failed to prove all of the elements of
the offense and the jury instruction had failed to inform the
jury that those elements must be proved.5 The court stated
that the "purpose of Rule 5:25 is 'to protect the trial court
from appeals based upon undisclosed grounds, to prevent
the setting of traps on appeal, to enable the trial judge to
rule intelligently, and to avoid unnecessary reversals and
4'Campbell, 14 Va.App. at 996,421 S.E.2d at 657.
46
1d. at 997,421 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting Brown, 8 Va.App. at
132 380 S.E.2d at 11). According to Judge Barrow, an error is
"clear" if it is "apparent under existing statutory or case law
without the necessity of further judicial interpretation and
must not have been acquiesced in . . . by the complaining
party;" an error is "substantial" if it "affect[s] an essential ele-
ment of the trial;" and an error is "material" if it is "important
enough to affect the outcome of the trial: Id. at 997-98, 421
S.E.2d at 657-58.
-5 Va.App. 529,365 S.E.2d 237 (1988).
48ohnson, 5 Va.App. at 530,365 S.E.2d at 238.
91d. at 532,365 S.E.2d at 239 (emphasis added).
5"Id. at 534,365 S.E.2d at 240.
511d.
51241 Va. 244,402 S.E.2d 678 (1991).
5Jiminez, 241 Va. at 246,402 S.E.2d at 678.
5Id. at 247,402 S.E.2d at 680.
mistrials.': "5 The rule is meant "to promote, not hinder, the
administration of justice:51 In this case, the statute required
the Commonwealth to show that the defendant had
received written notice of a request to return an advance of
money. The jury instruction omitted this element of the
offense, and the Commonwealth did not produce any evi-
dence to establish it. Even though the evidence showed that
Jiminez had received actual notice, the court held that the
ends of justice required the conviction to be set aside
because the defendant was convicted of a "non-offense""
Significantly, the court held that, even when the defense
makes no objection and proffers no alternative instructions
at trial, the trial court has an affirmative duty in every case
to instruct the jury on vital principles. Failure to do so can
be reversible error, notwithstanding the contemporaneous
objection rule.5
The Supreme Court of Virginia also applied the ends of
justice exception in Yarborough v. Commonwealth.9 The
defendant was convicted of the use of a firearm in the com-
mission of a felony. The victim testified that the defendant
said, "[t]his is a stickup," and that she saw something pro-
truding from the defendant's pocket and thought it was a
gun.60 No gun was ever found.The court held that evidence
which only showed that the defendant "might" have had a
gun was insufficient.61 The Commonwealth must prove that
there actually was a gun.Therefore, the court set aside the
conviction despite the fact that the defendant had failed to
raise this objection at trial or to assign error to the instruc-
tion on appeal.
62
Whether it is ultimately applied or not, it is clear that the
ends of justice exception is routinely considered by both the
Virginia Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Virginia
in noncapital criminal cases when the contemporaneous
objection rule is invoked.6 Indeed, several decisions suggest
that consideration of the exception is mandatory.
"Id. at 248-49, 402 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting Fisher v.
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 414, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 (1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989)).
5Jiminez, 241 Va. at 249,402 S.E.2d at 680.
57Id. at 251,402 S.E.2d at 681.
-Id. at 250-51, 402 S.E.2d at 681. See also Wooden v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758,284 S.E.2d 811 (1981) (also holding
that tendering an alternative jury instruction was sufficient to sat-
isfy the rule, even though no specific objection was made to the
instruction actually given).
5927 Va. 215,441 S.E.2d 342 (1994).
60Yarborough, 27 Va. at 216,441 S.E.2d at 343.
61Id. at 218-19, 441 S.E.2d at 344.
62
1d. at 219,441 S.E.2d at 344.
63See also White v. Commonwealth, 3 VaApp. 231,348 SE.2d
866 (1986) (ends of justice exception considered but rejected);
Glasgow v. Peatross, 201 Va. 43,109 S.E.2d 135 (1959) (exception
applied to review jury instruction which was "hopelessly confus-
ing and meaningless"); Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 VaApp. 65,366
S.E.2d 274 (1988) (Commonwealth failed to negate defendant's
good faith claim of bona fide right, therefore there was insufficient
evidence of intent to commit criminal trespass).
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V. The Ends of Justice Exception in Capital Cases
As the following cases illustrate, the treatment of the
ends of justice exception in capital cases stands in marked
contrast to the approach outlined above. In fact, when the
defendant in a case has been sentenced to death, the ends
of justice exception is treated as if it does not even exist.
Quintana v. Commonwealth," for example, is typical
of the way in which the contemporaneous objection rule is
applied by the Supreme Court of Virginia in capital cases. In
a footnote, the court noted that there were 28 assignments
of error which were procedurally defaulted.5 Without any
discussion at all, the court simply stated that "[a]pplying
Rules 5:20(b) and 5:21 in accord with repeated precedent,
we will not notice such matters."'
Similar treatment was given to the defendant in Bunch
v. Commonwealth.67 Bunch was convicted of capital mur-
der in the commission of a robbery. On appeal, he chal-
lenged the validity of a search warrant on the basis that he
had not been permitted to inspect the supporting affidavit.
The court dismissed his claim in one sentence, citing Rule
21.68
This standard is not relaxed when a defendant elects to
proceed pro se, and thus does not have the benefit of the
assistance of counsel at trial. In Townes v. Commonwealth,69
for example, the defendant argued that, because he repre-
sented himself at trial, he should be excused from the appli-
cation of Rule 5:25.70 The Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
agreed. The court listed ten assignments of error which
were waived because of a failure to object at trial. One of
the alleged errors was that the trial court had failed to
instruct on lesser included offenses, as required by Beck v.
Alabama.7' Townes also claimed that the prosecution faled
to turn over exculpatory evidence and that the trial court
erred in excluding tape recordings of prior inconsistent
statements by certain witnesses and in excluding evidence
that Townes was ineligible for parole.7' The court did not
consider any of these issues on the merits, nor did it exam-
ine the record to determine whether the ends of justice
exception should be applied. In fact, the court made no
mention of the ends of justice exception whatsoever. It sim-
ply stated that it would "not consider those matters to
-224 Va. 127,295 S.E.2d 643 (1982).
6"Quintana, 224 Va. at 134,295 S.E.2d at 645, n.1.
"Id. Rule 5:21 is the former version of Rule 5:25.
6225 Va. 423,304 S.E.2d 271 (1983).
"'Bunch, 225 Va. at 435,304 S.E.2d at 278.
0234 Va. 307,362 S.E.2d 650 (1987).
7 Townes, 234 Va. at 319, 362 S.E.2d at 656. Townes argued
that the "good cause" exception to Rule 5:25 should apply. Id.
7,447 U.S. 625 (1980) (holding that failure to grant instruc-
tions on lesser included offenses was reversible error in a capital
case).
'Townes, 234 Va. at 319-20, 362 S.E.2d at 657. See also
Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79,87-88,459 S.E.2d 97, 101-
102 (1995) (also dismissing a Brady claim by summarily citing Rule
5:25).
which Townes failed to make proper objection in the trial
court."73 By way of consolation, the court noted that while
Townes "may not have preserved every possible point for
appeal, his trial performance was surprisingly competent
for one lacking formal legal training:
74
In several cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia has even
quoted Rule 5:25 with the portion referring to the ends of
justice exception conspicuously left out. In Chichester v.
Commonwealth,"3 for example, the court stated that "Rule
5:25 provides: Error will not be sustained to any ruling of
the trial court ... before which the case was initially tried
unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at
the time of the ruling"' 6 The rest of that sentence is omit-
ted. Predictably, the court went on to hold that "[s]ince
Chichester did not object to the trial court's rulings when
they were made, we will not consider" his assignments of
error." The identical quotation of Rule 5:25 was produced
in Swann v. Commonwealth,' before the court summarily
dismissed over ten claims of error with absolutely no con-
sideration of the issues on the merits. Intentionally or not,
these opinions give the erroneous impression that there is
no such thing as an ends of justice exception to Rule 5:25,
at least not one that applies in capital cases.
Another example of the Supreme Court of Virginia's
unbending application of the contemporaneous objection
rule is Breard v. Commonwealth.79 The defendant moved
for a mistrial after highly prejudicial victim impact evidence
was admitted at the guilt phase, but because the motion
was not timely, the court held that Breard was barred from
challenging the trial court's denial of the motion on
appeal.' Once more, the ends of justice exception was
treated as if it did not exist.
The Supreme Court of Virginia's abandonment of the
ends of justice exception is perhaps most galling in cases
where the defendant's claims of error, at least on their face,
make a strong showing of reversible constitutional error. In
Chandler v. Commonwealth,"' for instance, the defendant
alleged that the trial court erred in responding to a question
the jury asked pertaining to parole eligibility.The trial court
instructed the jury not to consider the issue.8 2 The previous
year, in Simmons v. South Carolina,13 the United States
Supreme Court held that, when the defendant's future dan-
gerousness was at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding,
the jury must be instructed on parole eligibility. In
7"1d. at 319,362 S.E.2d at 657.
74Id. at 321, 362 S.E.2d at 658. See also O'Dell v.
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672,678-79,364 S.E.2d 491,494-95 (also
routinely applying contemporaneous objection rule to a pro se
defendant with a conclusory statement and a cite to Rule 5:25).
71248 Va. 311,448 S.E.2d 638 (1994).
76Swann, 248 Va. at 320,448 S.E.2d at 645.
7,Id.
-247 Va. 222,229,441 S.E.2d 195,200 (1994).
79248 Va. 68,445 S.E.2d 670 (1994).
'Breard, 248 Va.at 81,445 S.E.2d at 678.
8 249 Va. 270, 445 S.E.2d 219 (1995).
'Chandler, 249 Va. at 280-81,455 S.E.2d at 225.
83512 U.S. 154 (1994).
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Chandler, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, because
the defendant had failed to object to the trial court's answer
at the time it was given, he was barred from raising the issue
on appeal.8 Once again, the court made no mention of the
ends of justice exception.
Another potentially serious constitutional error was
ignored in King v. Commonwealth.5 The defendant chal-
lenged the admission of incriminating statements which
had allegedly been elicited after the police denied his
request for counsel, in violation of Edwards v. Arizona.8
The court held that, because the defendant had not object-
ed to the admission of the evidence on that ground at trial,
the issue was procedurally barred on appeal. The ends of
justice exception was neither mentioned nor discussed,
despite the fact that substantial rights were at issue.8
Substantial rights were also at issue in Coppola v.
Commonwealth.8 The defendant alleged that the trial
court's instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of
proof on the element of intent to the defendant.The chal-
lenged instruction was similar to one that the United States
Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional in Sandstrom v.
Montana,s9 which was decided after the defendant's trial
but before his appeal.Without considering whether, partic-
ularly in light of Sandstrom, the ends of justice would be
served by allowing the defendant to raise this issue on
appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia simply ruled that,
because no objection was made at trial, the issue was
barred on appeal.9
In Stamper v. Commonwealth,9' the court again upheld
a potentially erroneous death sentence without any exami-
nation of the record to determine whether the ends of jus-
tice required that the defendant's claim be heard on appeal.
Stamper alleged that the trial court's answer to a question
posed by the jury violated the rule that only the 'trigger-
man' can receive a death sentence.2 Without addressing the
merits of Stamper's claim, the court simply stated that"[t]he
objection on this ground, not asserted in the trial court,
comes too late' 93
The only capital case in which the ends of justice
exception has ever been applied is Ball v. Common-
wealth.9 The defendant was convicted of capital murder in
'Chandler, 249 Va. at 281,455 S.E.2d at 226.
85243 Va. 353,416 S.E.2d 669 (1992)...
86451 U.S. 447 (1981) (holding that police-initiated question-
ing subsequent to a request for counsel was unconstitutional).
WKing, 243 Va. at 358,416 S.E.2d at 671.
'1222 Va. 369,282 S.E.2d 10 (1981).
'"442 U.S. 510 (1978) (holding that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that the law presumes a person to intend the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts).
9"Coppola, 222 Va. at 372,282 S.E.2d at 11.
9'220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979).
9"The judge instructed the jury that it was irrelevant whether
anyone else was involved, the only issue was whether Stamper
"was involved"in the killing. Stamper, 220 Va. at 275,257 S.E.2d at
818.
93Id. at 275, 257 S.E.2d at 819.
'221 Va. 754,273 S.E.2d 790 (1981).
the commission of a robbery, but received a life sentence.91
On appeal, he challenged his conviction on the ground that
the trial court erred in refusing to grant an instruction he
proffered at trial. 6 The court found that, although the defen-
dant had moved to strike the Commonwealth's evidence at
trial, he had not raised the proffered jury instruction as a
ground for his motion.97 Therefore, the issue was barred on
appeal under then Rule 5:21. However, in this case the court
carefuly examined the evidence and found that there was
"no evidence to support a capital murder instruction"
because the evidence showed that the robbery had not
been consummated." Since the defendant committed an
attempted robbery rather than a completed robbery, the
court applied the ends of justice exception and overturned
the conviction.99 The court held that the ends of justice
exception was applicable in this case because "Ball has
been convicted of a crime which under the evidence he
could not properly be found guilty:""'
The only other capital case in which the ends of justice
exception received substantial consideration was Hairston v.
Commonwealth."' Like Ball, Hairston was convicted of capi-
tal murder but received a life sentence instead of the death
penalty.The contemporaneous objection rule was applied to
bar several claims on appeal. Significantly, although the ends
of justice exception was not applied, the court did devote
two full paragraphs of discussion to its applicability""0
VI. Analysis
"Because issues that have been procedurally defaulted
are not noticed byVirginia, and are therefore not discussed,
it is impossible to be certain of the exact number of meri-
torious cases that would have warranted reversal but for a
procedural-default." 3 What does appear certain, however, is
that Virginia courts apply two different standards for deter-
mining whether to enforce the contemporaneous objection
rule or apply the ends of justice exception.When the defen-
dant has been sentenced to a penalty less than death, courts
"must" consider whether the error was clear, material and
affected substantial rights."04 On the other hand, when the
defendant has been sentenced to death,Virginia courts have
effectively held that the ends of justice exception does not
apply, and should not even be considered. In sum, if a defen-
dant has been sentenced to death, any objections which
95Bal 221 Va. at 755-56,273 S.E.2d at 791.
96Id. at 756,273 S.E.2d at 791.
9Id. at 758,273 S.E.2d at 792-93.
98Id. at 757,273 S.E.2d at 792.
99Ball, 221 Va. at 758-59, 273 S.E.2d at 793.
'"Id. at 758-59,273 S.E.2d at 793.
10116Va.App. 941,434 S.E.2d 350 (1993).
""'Hairston, 16 Va.App. at 944-45,434 S.E.2d at 352-53.
""'Clarke, supra note 12, at 374.
"Johnson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 529, 365 S.E.2d 237
(1988);Jiminez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 402 S.E.2d 678
(1991); Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 126, 380 S.E.2d 8
(1989).
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were not made at trial are procedurally barred on appeal in
Virginia, no matter what.
Of course, no court has ever explicitly adopted the fore-
going rule. In practice, however, the above paragraph accu-
rately describes how the ends of justice exception is
applied in Virginia. In noncapital cases, courts review the
record and analyze the case law to determine whether the
exception should apply. In capital cases, the general rule is
that the ends of justice exception is effectively read out of
the statute. It is treated as if it does not exist. Not only has
the exception never been applied in a case in which a death
sentence was challenged,105 it has never even been dis-
cussed.When the ends of justice exception is mentioned at
all, it is only in those rare instances when the defense specif-
ically raises it on appeal. °6 Even in those cases, the court
does not proceed with a full, or even cursory, analysis of the
rule, its purposes, and its applicability to the record in the
case at hand, as it routinely does in noncapital cases.
Instead, the court simply states in conclusory language that
the exception does not apply.
One explanation for the disparate treatment between
capital and noncapital cases might be the fact that most of
the appeals in noncapital cases are heard by the Virginia
Court of Appeals, which applies Rule 5A:18, whereas all of
the appeals in cases in which a death sentence has been
imposed are heard by the Supreme Court of Virginia, apply-
ing Rule 5:25. However, the disparate treatment of capital
cases cannot be satisfactorily explained either as a reflec-
tion of a difference in the two versions of the contempora-
neous objection rule or as a product of the different per-
sonnel on the two courts. In the first place, the relevant lan-
guage in the two rules is nearly identical. Second, even if the
comparison is limited to only those cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, the difference in treatment
between capital and noncapital cases remains apparent.
This practice benefits the Commonwealth in two ways.
First, it contributes to judicial economy.The burden on the
supreme court is reduced because it is relieved from having
to consider the merits of every issue raised on appeal. Rigid
enforcement of contemporaneous objection rules also
lessons the burden placed on trial courts, since some cases
that might otherwise have to be retried because of clear,
material errors affecting substantial rights will, under the
current practice, be affirmed on appeal. Second, strict appli-
cation of procedural default rules is one way of expediting
the capital sentencing process. The fewer issues that are
reviewed on the merits by appellate courts, the faster capi-
tal defendants will be ushered through the system to their
eventual deaths.
"1"[The Supreme Court of Virginia has never looked past a
procedural-default to reverse a death sentence.... f Clarke, supra
note 12, at 367.
106'MTs does not mean that the ends of justice exception is
mentioned in every case in which the defense requests that it be
applied, only that the exception has never been mentioned in a
case when the defense has not specifically referred to it.
These 'benefits', however, do not come without signifi-
cant costs. Procedural default rules allow constitutional
errors to go uncorrected. In some cases, this may result in
the execution of the innocent. In others, it will result in an
execution carried out after the deprivation of significant
rights. Both instances are equally repugnant to our system
of justice. In Brown, the court of appeals commented that
"[t]he state's interest in prevailing at trial and in upholding
the verdict on appeal must be tempered by its duty to work
for a just, fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases:1 7
For reasons previously noted, this duty is even stronger in
capital cases.As the court observed in Brown, the "integrity
of our judicial system" is undermined when meritorious
claims are dismissed with the routine application of the
contemporaneous objection rule."8 Furthermore, the con-
tinued erosion of procedural protections in capital cases
"runs afoul of society's traditional sense of fairness and jus-
tice and ... espouse[s] the notion that a society committed
to the sanctity of individual life is willing to sacrifice con-
stitutional values in order to clear the way for death: 19
The injustice of rigidly applying procedural default
rules in capital cases is compounded by the fact that capi-
tal defendants are forced to suffer for the mistakes made by
the attorneys provided by the state itself for their defense.
As one author stated, "[tihe cost to justice of refusing to
decide potentially meritorious claims in death-penalty cases
is in the execution of persons whose cases might have been
decided otherwise but for the ignorance or negligence of
their lawyers in failing to properly raise and preserve the
appropriate claims.""' Another commentator observed that
"[w]hile the concept of finality is desirable, using proce-
dural defaults to attain this goal ... enables the state to ben-
efit from the commingling of its own constitutional wrong-
doing and the defense counsel's failure to raise these
issues?""
These observations, together with the oft-cited consti-
tutional principle that capital proceedings require height-
ened reliability and "super due process; strongly support
the argument that Virginia courts should apply a more lib-
eral formulation of the ends of justice exception in capital
cases.12 Even if this approach is rejected, however, it is dif-
ficult to conceive of a justifiable reason for providing even
less procedural protection in capital cases, rather than
more. Particularly illuminating are those cases in which the
"078Va.App. 126,133,380 S.E.2d 8,11 (1989).
""8Brown, 8 Va.App. at 133,380 S.E.2d at 11, n.3.
"'9Wells, supra note 1, at 489, n.58.
11Clarke, supra note 12, at 372.
"'Wells, supra note 1, at 436-37.
"'At one time, the Supreme Court of Virginia seemed to
accept this view. In 1965, the court approvingly quoted a passage
stating that "It]he fact that questions are insufficiently raised will
not preclude their consideration by the appellate court in a capi-
tal case ... ." Cooper, 205 Va. 883,884, 140 S.E.2d 688,692 (quot-
ing 3 AmJur, Appeal and Error, § 248, p. 33).Today, by refusing to
even consider the application of the ends of justice exception in
capital cases, the court has adopted an approach that is at polar
opposites with this view.
Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 - Page 75
court misquotes Rule 5:25 so that the ends of justice provi-
sion is conspicuously omitted. Whether this omission is
deliberate or subconscious, it clearly reflects the prevailing
attitude on the Supreme Court of Virginia today. When
reviewing the validity of a death sentence, the only end the
court apparently seeks to attain is the dismissal of any and
all claims as quickly and easily as possible.
Theoretically, this persistent pattern of disparate appli-
cation of the contemporaneous objection rule could pro-
vide a basis for a constitutional challenge to Virginia's capi-
tal sentencing scheme. Realistically, however, it is extremely
doubtful that any court would be receptive to such an argu-
ment. No matter how persuasive the evidence, no court is
likely to rule that the seven justices on the Supreme Court
of Virginia are incapable of being objective in capital cases.
VII. Practical Implications
As a result of the Supreme Court of Virginia's current
approach to the application of the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule in capital cases, capital defense attorneys should
make a supreme effort at trial to preserve issues for appeal.
However vehemently and persuasively one may argue that
the approach followed by the Supreme Court of Virginia is
wrong, unfair and unjust, such protestations are of little
help to the client sitting on death row.
Nevertheless, even the most zealous, competent and
conscientious attorneys will occasionally make mistakes.
Therefore, it is important to construct an effective strategy
for raising the ends of justice exception on appeal. Defense
counsel should try to formulate arguments designed to con-
vince the Supreme Court of Virginia to return to the stan-
dard of Cooper v. Commonwealth,13 which would require
the court to apply the exception in cases involving the
deprivation of constitutional rights, as well as claims of
actual innocence."4 This approach is arguably consistent
with the Brown-Campbell-Jiminez"3 line of cases, and is
certainly consistent with the long-standing principal that
capital cases warrant the application of more, rather than
less, procedural protections than noncapital cases.
113205 Va. 883,140 S.E.2d 688 (1965).
"'Campbell, 205 Va. at 892,140 S.E.2d at 694.
"'Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 VaApp. 126, 380 S.E.2d 8
(1989); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 VaApp. 988,421 S.E.2d
652 (1992);Jiminez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 402 S.E.2d
678 (1991).
GUILT AND INNOCENCE ARE MATTERS OF DEGREE, DEATH IS FINAL:
WHAT TO DO WHEN YOUR CLIENT PREFERS EXECUTION
"... commit cruelty on a person long enough and the mind begins to go."'
-Sophocles, Antigone
BY: ANDREA L. MOSELEY
I. Introduction
Capital defense attorneys spend an extraordinary
amount of energy, resources and time trying to save the
lives of their clients. While clients and attorneys may dis-
agree on any number of issues, generally it is assumed that
both the capital defendant and his or her attorney share at
least one common goal, avoiding the death penalty.
However, to the contrary, the phenomenon of the capital
defendant electing execution is not uncommon.2 In consid-
ering the current legal and ethical responsibilities of capital
defense attorneys, it is important to be informed about
'Ismene: But look, we're both guilty, both condemned to
death. Antigone: [No, Justice will never suffer that ... ] Courage!
Live your life. I gave myself to death long ago ... Creon:They're
both mad ... Ismene:True my King, the sense we're born with can-
not last forever ... commit cruelty on a person long enough and
the mind begins to go. Sophocles, Antigone, (Robert Fagles trans.,
Penguin, 1984).
'Welsh S.White, Defendant's Who Elect Execution, 48 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 853,854 (1987).
what to do when your client elects execution over repre-
sentation.
Five of the first eight people executed after the rein-
statement of capital punishment resisted some part of their
defense.3 Defendants' reasons for wanting to abandon their
case and receive a speedy execution include wanting to
avoid the physical conditions of death row,4 bravado,5 and
the desire to spare his or her family from further agony.
6
Perhaps the most notable voluntary execution case was
Gilmore v. Utah.7 Gilmore killed and robbed a service sta-
tion attendant and a motel night clerk in July 1976.8 On
3G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency,
Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74
J. CRiM. L. & CIjiNOLOGY 860,861 (1983).
'Richard C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices forAttorneys Whose
Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEo.J. LEGAL ETmCS 799,801 n.16 (1990).
'See White, supra note 2,at 872, referring to, Gilmore v. Utah,
429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
6See Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243,253,257 S.E.2d
797,804 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1103 (1980).
7429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
'White, supra note 2, at 853 n.2, citing, Goldman,Death Wish,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1976, at 26.
